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NOTE
Electronic Filing and

Informational Privacy
BYKYLA KITAJIMA*

Introduction
Imagine that you are involved in a messy lawsuit. Would you
want your pleadings to be available on the Internet for anyone to see?
This might soon be a reality. Already, some courts have implemented
electronic filing pilots programs. Eventually, court pleadings and
documents will be available to anyone with Internet access.
By transmitting court information through an electronic
medium,2 Internet filing is the newest way to process legal documents.
There are tremendous benefits to filing court documents over the
Internet.' Electronic filing increases judicial efficiency and cuts costs
for attorneys, clients, and courts.4 Attorneys can file documents
without ever leaving their offices! The system also provides easier
public access to court documents and the judicial system.6 Anyone
can view documents and court calendars, retrieve court information
* J. D. University of California, Hastings College of the Law (2000); B.A.
University of California, San Diego (1997). The author thanks Professor Ashutosh
Bhagwat for his help and substantive review and Cary Zak and Megan Jellinek for their
editing and support.
1. See, e.g., Rinat Fried, Electronic Filing: The End of Bike Messengers?,
RECORDER, Oct. 13,1998, at 4.
2. Steven P. Daitch & Philip B. Ytterberg, Electronic Filing: Divine Intervention
Needed?, LAW TECH. PROD. NEWS, Dec. 1998, at 97.
3. See id.
4. See idL
5. See id.
6. See Wendy R. Leibowitz, Electronic Filing Looks Easy, But Chaotic Approach
Slows Progress,NAT'L L. J., Jan. 13,1997, at B20.
[563]
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and forms, pay filing fees, and receive court notices In the United
States, approximately 200 million filings are made each year.8
Implementation of electronic filing systems will make these filings
quicker, easier, and cheaper.9
We live in an "information society" where information is a
valuable commodity."0 The Internet continues to be a substantial
source of information." Current technology allows us to store more
information for longer periods of time. Given the efficiency of the
Internet, the benefits of electronic filing are substantial. Internet use,
however, generates growing concerns about possible privacy
invasions.1
Court documents have traditionally been public documents.
Now, because Internet information is more readily accessible and
easier to manipulate than traditional paper documents, we need to
consider new safeguards to protect individual privacy interests. This
note presents two means of addressing the problems inherent in
Internet filing. First, this note discusses possible legislative solutions
to the privacy problems associated with electronic filing of court
documents. Second, this note considers recognition of a new
constitutional right to informational privacy.
I. Benefits of Electronic Filing and Particular Privacy Problems
Electronic filing allows attorneys to file court documents without
ever making a trip to the courthouse. 4 Attorneys can file court
documents from their home or office computers. Clerks will then
receive the documents on their computers in the courtroom. 5 Many16
courts have already implemented electronic filing pilot projects.
7. See Daitch & Ytterberg, supranote 2, at 97.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See Susan E. Gindin, Lost and Found in Cyberspace:InformationalPrivacy in the
Age of the Internet,34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1153, 1162 (1997) (footnotes omitted).
11. See FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 6-7 (1997).
12. See ELLEN ALDERMAN & CAROLINE KENNEDY, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 324
(1995).
13. See Rocco Cammarere, Electronic Access: Privacy Invasion?, N.J. LAWYER, June
30, 1997, at 1.
14. See Daitch & Ytterberg, supranote 2, at 97.
15. See Albert L. Wells & Michael Winger, Now in Development. The Courthouse on
the Web, LEGAL TECH, March 1998, at 1.
16. See, e.g., Fried, supra note 1, at 4 (discussing San Francisco Superior Court's
electronic filing implementation in October, 1998 for their asbestos cases). See also Peter
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Since there are no technological barriers to electronic filing,17 the
system is projected to become widespread in the near future. 8 In fact,
many judges and court administrators are so enthusiastic about the
system that they are attending sold-out electronic filing seminars,
sponsored by The National Center For State Courts.19 Further, in
some jurisdictions, attorneys are already able to electronically serve
documents on each other. 20
The goal of electronic filing is to "improv[e] accessibility and
quality of justice."2' Attorneys and judges seem to agree that the new
Attorneys like electronic filing
system accomplishes both goals.'
because it saves time and money.' Since they do not have to hire
messengers or worry about getting to the courthouse before the
building closes, attorneys are able to spend more time preparing the
substance of their filings.24 Also, electronic filing is especially helpful
for filing in out-of-state courts.25 Another advantage of the electronic
system is that multiple viewers can simultaneously access filed
documents. 26 Attorneys are able to scrutinize documents filed in
either their own cases or related cases without having to track down
tangible copies.' Attorneys can also access court filings from a home
or office computer.'
Electronic filing also makes the judicial system more accessible
to those who cannot hire lawyers. For example, Maricopa County in
Arizona has Arizona QuickCourt workstations, which "allow
members of the public to fill out forms in English and Spanish; people
can educate themselves on the basics of.. .family law matters and file
J. Ausili, Using the EDNY ElectronicFilingSystem, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 12, 1999, at 5 (discussing
implementation of electronic filing in the Eastern District of New York).
17. See Tom Little, Electronic Filing: Why Aren't More Courts Offering It?, LEGAL
TECH, Nov. 1998, at 1 (describing a technology survey completed by the West Group).
18. See Daitch & Ytterberg, supra note 2, at 97.
19. See id.
20. However, currently, there are no universal standards for electronic serving of
documents, and some attorneys are worried about the expense of this technology. See,
e.g., Fried, supra note 1, at 4.
21. Little, supra note 17, at 1.
22. See, e.g., Daitch & Ytterberg, supra note 2, at 97.
23. See id.
24. See Albert L. Wells & Michael Winger, Now in Development: The Courthouse on
the Web, LEGAL TECH, March 1998, at 1.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See Leibowitz, supra note 6.
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themselves."29

the papers
Judges like electronic filing because the system presents an
efficient way to manage the numerous documents involved in
litigation." Electronic filing is especially useful in complex litigation
cases-where cumbersome, voluminous filings are common.
In
addition, the electronic filing system saves courts money.' A Kansas
court compared the cost of filing documents electronically rather than
by means of the traditional paper method.3 "To file 100 documents
traditionally took more than 10 hours to process and roughly $220 in
staff time. But to file the same documents electronically took 9
minutes and cost a mere $2.80."' Electronic filing also saves clients
money."
In the United States, clients pay their attorneys
approximately $35.00 per delivery event, which does not include the
cost of "rush" deliveries. 6 Electronic filing could eliminate these
delivery charges.37
Although there are clear benefits to the electronic filing system,
problems still frustrate certain aspects of the electronic process. For
example, there are no universal guidelines for electronic filing. 9
Further, it is unclear how courts will fund the system. 0 As a practical
matter, some attorneys worry that their documents will not actually
reach their destinations.4 These attorneys will feel assured only after
they receive a faxed confirmation from a court clerk or secretary. 2
The most serious concerns are the access and privacy problems that
arise whenever information is available on-line.43
The easy
accessibility of information increases the potential for its misuse.'
29. Id.
30. See Fried, supra note 1, at 4.
31. See id.
32. See Daitch & Ytterberg, supra note 2, at 97.
33. See id.
34. Id.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See Daitch & Ytterberg, supra note 2, at 97; Cammarere, supra note 13, at 1;
Little, supra note 17, at 1.
39. See Little, supra note 17, at 1.
40. See id.
41. See Liebowitz, supra note 6, at B20.
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See CATE, supra note 11, at 3.
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Corporations and individuals are taking advantage of current
technology, using personal information to profit." For example,
"AOL, the nation's largest private online service, confirmed that it
was compiling both the names and addresses of its subscribers and
packaging lists with demographic information to sell to marketing
companies and manufacturers."46 In addition, criminals are using
personal information in order to commit "identity theft":
A clever swindler starts by using just a few bits of personal
information, perhaps your full name and SSN, to access
Internet databases and thereby obtain your address, telephone
number, driver's license number, and so on. The swindler can
then apply for credit using your good name, run up bills, take
over bank accounts, rent apartments, buy cars, and at times
even take out mortgages .... The important legal point about
identity theft is that, unlike the accused in criminal cases, who
have "reasonable doubt" on their side, victims of credit fraud
bear the burden of proving they are not the individuals who
incurred the debts and rang up the purchases in question.
People are becoming more and more concerned about their
confidentiality, 48 and rightly so.
Criminals and profit-seeking
organizations can access personal information on-line with
astounding ease. 9 As information becomes easier to access, the
privacy concerns of individuals and corporations become even more
significant of an issue.'
Electronic filing presents particular privacy concerns. People are
involved in lawsuits that cover a wide spectrum of issues. Potentially,
a litigant's work history, medical information, marital history, family
problems, and financial dealings could be disclosed in on-line
pleadings. Litigants, unlike average e-mail or Internet users, do not
have access to the same privacy protections. Generally, when using
the Internet, there are certain safeguards that one can use to protect
him or herself." For example, a person can refrain from disclosing
certain information, such as credit card numbers and addresses, over
the Internet. Litigants, however, may not be able to withhold
45. See DAVID BRIN, THE TRANSPARENT SOCIETY 57 (1998).

46. Id.
47. Id. at 59-60.
48. See id. at 25.
49. See id. at 58.
50. See, e.g., Matt Beer, Another ID Number Flap Hits Intel, S.F. EXAMINER, March
11, 1999, at B1 (describing how Intel is facing criticism for their computer chip that
identifies users when they use the Internet).
51. See Gindin, supranote 10, at 1174-79.
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information, as inclusion of the information in pleadings may be
necessary to the lawsuit. Inclusion of this information is thus publicly
available and may be subject to manipulation on-line. Electronic
filing, therefore, poses particular privacy problems that extend
beyond those inherent in the general Internet context.
H. Public Access to Courts
There is a common law right of public access to court records."
This common law right "exists to enhance popular trust in the fairness
of the justice system, to promote public participation in the workings
of government, and to protect constitutional guarantees."53 However,
the scope of this common law right is not clearly defined and the right
is not absolute. 4 Thus, individual courts have taken it upon
themselves to weigh competing interests in determining the reach of
the common law right of public access.55 Often, courts consider
"whether public access is necessary to promote trustworthiness and
respect in the judicial system."56
Generally, courts have upheld the presumption of public access
to court records, including settlement agreements and documents
filed in conjunction with summary judgment motions."
Courts
"decided that settlement agreements are an important aspect of the
civil judicial system, and therefore, public access to these documents
is necessary to promote trustworthiness in the judicial system and
enhance public understanding of the system." 58 For similar reasons,
some courts have also concluded that the right of access applies to
documents filed in conjunction with summary judgment motions.
However, courts are less likely to allow public access to documents
filed in conjunction with discovery motions because public access
would be contrary to the goals of discovery and would not further the

52. See Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589,597 (1978).
53. Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the
Courts, 105 HARv. L. REv. 427,429 (1991).
54. See Diane Apa, Common Law Right of Public Access - The Third Circuit Limits
its Expansive Approach to the Common-Law Right of PublicAccess to JudicialRecords, 39
VILL. L. REv. 981, 982-86 (1994).
55. See id. at 985.
56. Id. at 992.
57. See id. at 986-89.
58. Id. at 988.
59. See id. at 989.
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objectives of the common law right of public access.' In general
though, courts adhere to a strong presumption of public access for
most court documents, absent a showing of exceptional
circumstances.61 In the electronic filing context, this right to public
access must be reconciled with litigants' privacy rights.
I. Electronic Documents vs. Paper Documents: Equal
Treatment?
With the advent of electronic filing and the Internet availability
of court documents, public documents have become easier to access,
compile, and manipulate.62 Both the ease of access and danger of
manipulation prompt another question: should electronic documents
be treated the same as paper documents? 6 Those who advocate
equal treatment of electronic and paper documents argue that paper
documents that are considered "public" should likewise be treated as
"public," regardless of medium. ' A New Jersey subcommittee
"concluded that 'drawing artificial distinctions between paper and
electronic records for the sake of privacy expectations which are not
realistic in today's information society is not an appropriate policy
response."'65 Other commentators, however, including New Jersey
Supreme Court Justice Marie L. Garibaldi, are concerned that "the
computer's speed and agility to analyze public records may somehow
impinge on a person's privacy rights."' The American Civil Liberties
Union of New Jersey also expressed their concern, stating that they
were:
[T]roubled by the accessibility of entire data bases to inspection
and copying, and by the possibility that such information could
be manipulated. For example, corporations or individuals could
create lists that would be used by employers and landlords to
determine individuals' qualifications or eligibility based on

60. See Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 11-12 (1st Cir. 1986).
61. See Ronald D. May, Public Access to Civil Court Records: A Common Law
Approach, 39 VAND. L. REv. 1465, 1478-1490 (1986).
62. See CATE, supranote 11, at 1-2.
63. See, e.g., Cammarere, supra note 13, at 1.
64. See id. See also Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Federal Electronic Information Policy, 63
TEMP. L. REV. 201, 224 (1990) (stating that the prevailing view under the Freedom of
Information Act is that electronic documents should be treated the same as paper
documents).
65. Anna Snider, Public Domain Dismissing Privacy Concerns, Court Panel Urges
ElectronicAccess to Computerized Records, 147 N.J.L.J. 1 (1997).
66. Cammarere, supra note 13, at 1.
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litigation history in wrongful discharge or landlord-tenant
actions. 67
Justice Garibaldi also distinguished electronic documents from
paper documents, stating that "[u]nlike paper records, computerized
records can be rapidly retrieved, searched, and reassembled in novel
and unique ways. '
There is truth to this distinction. Paper documents are less likely
to be misused because they are more difficult to actually obtain and
copy. In order for a person to retrieve a document, he or she would
need to make a trip to the courthouse during business hours, wait in
line, wait for an employee to find the file, and then wait for copies (or
make copies him or herself). In contrast, electronic documents can be
retrieved, copied, and manipulated without ever having to leave your
desk. The public access characteristics of electronic documents
indicate that, at least in the electronic filing context, electronic
documents should be treated with more care than their paper
counterparts. 69
It is presently unclear whether the advent of electronic court
documents will lead to increased misuse of information. Privacy
concerns, however, are likely to grow once court pleadings become
universally available on the Internet. Although the benefits of
electronic filing and access are substantial, as a precaution, courts and
legislators should consider and formulate guidelines to prevent
misuse of information.

IV. Legislative Solutions to Electronic Filing Privacy Concerns
Federal privacy legislation governing the use of personal
information is generally very specific, usually addressing a particular
industry or area.7 For instance, separate privacy legislation has been
directed at privacy in the workplace and the protection of both
educational and financial records.7 ' Another piece of legislation is the

67. Snider, supra note 65, at 1.
68. Cammarere, supranote 13, at 1.
69. Despite these concerns, it appears that the prevailing view is in favor of equal
treatment of electronic and paper documents. See Snider, supra note 65. Furthermore,
states are currently enacting legislation that "provides that contracts entered into by
electronic means have the same legal force and effect as paper contracts." George Raine,
New Way to Sign Papers, S.F. EXAMINER, Jan. 2, 2000, at B1. For example, California
recently enacted the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, "which validates all
transactions formed, transmitted and recorded electronically." Id.
70. See CATrE, supra note 11, at 80.
71. See icL at 81-85.
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Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), which contains
some protections for Internet users.? However, this protection is
limited by many exceptions. '3 For example, the Act does not protect
against interceptions of communications made to a system that is
"readily accessible to the general public."'74 Thus, "the ECPA is not
violated when postings to Usenet groups, listservs [sic], bulletin board
systems, and chat rooms are read and archived.,, 75 There are many
criticisms of existing privacy legislation, namely that "most of these
statutes contain exceptions that gut the protection."76
Privacy laws targeted at specific problem areas create a
patchwork of federal privacy legislation. Currently, there is no
comprehensive federal body of law to govern informational privacy as
a whole. Until such a body of law exists, the most practical way to
protect informational privacy is to implement state legislation
directed at specified targets. Thus, an effective way to protect
individual privacy interests within the judicial system is to enact state
legislation to govern electronic filing.
A. Proposed Uniform State Legislation

Uniform state legislation should accomplish two goals. First,
state law should provide a cause of action against individuals or
businesses that manipulate data for fraudulent purposes. Second,
state law should establish a commission, consisting of judges,
practicing attorneys, computer experts, and members of the public, to
establish uniform standards and guidelines for attorneys, courts, and
the public. In crafting guidelines, the commission must acknowledge
that the right to privacy conflicts with many other interests, including
"society's interest in free expression, preventing and punishing crime,
protection of private property, and the efficient operation of
government."' Thus, suggested guidelines and standards must be
flexible enough to accommodate these competing interests, while
simultaneously protecting the individual's interest in nondisclosure of
personal information. For example, the commission may consider
adopting a categorical approach to help determine when to prohibit
electronic filing. In particular, the commission may create special
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520,2701-2709 (1997).
See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g) (1994).
18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(i) (1994).
Gindin, supra note 10, at 1198.
ALDERMAN & KENNEDY, supra note 12, at 330.
Id. at 102.
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guidelines to govern family law and juvenile cases. In such situations,
where the privacy stakes are high, the judge would have discretion to
decide whether electronic filing is appropriate. In so deciding, the
judge should consider whether the privacy interests at stake are
greater than the need for on-line availability of court pleadings.
Although this would give judges a great deal of discretion, this
approach would at least provide some flexibility in deciding whether
electronic filing would be appropriate in a particular case.
Courts should also be required to employ certain security
measures to minimize manipulation of information. Courts should
consider restricting access to computer-generated lists from court
dockets, such as compilations of landlord-tenant claims in a given
county." Such lists are dangerous because they provide succinct lists
of similar cases, which can then be used in a fraudulent or
discriminatory manner. For example, landlords could obtain and use
compilations of landlord-tenant cases in their county to discriminate
against prospective tenants who have sued prior landlords. Courts
should also employ security measures, so that they are able to detect
tampering with documents. The San Francisco Superior Court has
hired "Dallas-based LAWPlus Inc.... [to] creat[e] a secure audit so
that any changes - including alterations to the content or backdating
- can be detected and traced."

Some citizens, attorneys included, lack the requisite technology
to effectively utilize electronic filing. The process, therefore, should
be voluntary - at least for the time being. One possible exception is
in complex litigation cases, where there are voluminous filings and
multiple parties. (In such cases, the benefits of electronic filing would
be great - it would eliminate the stacks of paper and reduce the
amount of paperwork for judges. However, it may be impractical to
get all parties to agree to electronic filing. Thus, it may be sensible to
require electronic filing in complex litigation cases.) It must be noted
that while electronic filing may increase the efficiency, it would be
unfair to penalize some individuals based on their lack of computer
access. Voluntary participation, however, will allow those who can
afford it to electronically file without penalizing those who lack the
requisite technology.
78. However, courts should not bar access to these lists altogether. Instead, courts
should employ methods to deter fraudulent activity. For example, individuals can apply
for passwords, which will allow them to gain access to the lists. The passwords enable
courts to know something about the individuals who are accessing the information.
79. Fried, supra note 1, at 4.
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By following these guidelines, litigants will become aware of the
privacy risks inherent in electronic access, and the invasion of privacy
risks will be minimized by the imposed restrictions. Although it is
impossible to prevent all misuse of information, state legislation and
guidelines are essential in order to protect individual privacy in the
electronic court system.
B. Possible Federal Legislation to Govern Electronic Filing

Federal legislation is another possible solution to potential
electronic filing problems. Congress may be able to use its
Commerce Clause power to regulate the sale and use of information
obtained from state court electronic filing databases. In general,
Congress can regulate three categories of interstate commerce:
channels of interstate commerce, instrumentalities of interstate
commerce, and activities that "substantially affect" interstate
commerce.80
In United States v. Lopez, the Court struck down the Gun Free
School Zones Act, which made possession of a firearm in or near
schools a federal offense, as an improper use of the federal commerce
power.8 ' A student, who was convicted under the Act for possession
of a gun in school, challenged the federal law on the grounds that
Congress lacked the power to enact the law.' The Court, agreeing
with the student, found that the Gun Free School Zones Act did not
"substantially affect" interstate commerce. Although Congress is not
required to adduce evidence of "substantial effect" on interstate
commerce for every piece of legislation it enacts under the Commerce
Clause, the Court stated that it would not defer to Congressional
judgment if Congress produces no evidence to support a "substantial
effect" on interstate commerce.'
Because Congress had not
accumulated evidence as to the impact that possession of guns in
schools had on interstate commerce, the Court did not defer to the
judgment of Congress. Instead, the Court conducted its own inquiry:
Did the regulation of firearm possession in or near school zones
substantially affect interstate commerce? In support of "substantial

80. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (discussing channels of interstate
commerce); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (discussing
"substantial effect" on interstate commerce); Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342 (1914)
(discussing instrumentalities).
81. 514 U.S. 549,551 (1995).
82. See id. at 552-53.
83. See id. at 562-63.
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effect" on interstate commerce, the Government put forth three
arguments: "First, the costs of violent crime are substantial, and,
through the mechanism of insurance, those costs are spread
throughout the population. Second, violent crime reduces the
willingness of individuals to travel to areas within the country that are
perceived to be unsafe."' Third, the Government argued that the
presence of guns in schools posed "a substantial threat to the
educational process by threatening the learning environment. "" The
Court rejected all of these arguments, reasoning that, if accepted,
Congress could effectively regulate any activity that might lead to
violent crime or reduced national productivity.' Congress, therefore,
would have unlimited authority to regulate anything and everything,
as long as it somehow decreased violent crime or national
productivity. Thus, the Court refused to uphold the constitutionality
of the Act.
In United States v. Darby, the Court held that Congress could use87
its commerce power to regulate channels of interstate commerce.
There, the Court upheld the Fair Labor Standards Act, which
prevented the interstate shipment of certain goods that did not meet
the Act's minimum wage and labor standards. In upholding the Act,
the Court stated: "While manufacture is not of itself interstate
commerce the shipment of manufactured goods interstate is such
commerce and the prohibition of such shipment by Congress is
indubitably a regulation of the commerce." 8
Although the federal commerce power appears broad, it is not
without limits.' Federal legislation, although a proper exercise of the
Congress' commerce power, may nevertheless be invalid as an
The Court revisited
improper intrusion on state autonomy.'
Commerce Clause and state autonomy issues in Reno v. Condon,
84. Id at 563-64.
85. Id. at 564.

86. See id.
87. 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941).
88. Id at 113.
89. See U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people.").
90. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (holding that Congress
cannot command the States' officers directly); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,
149 (1992) (holding that Congress cannot force the States to enact or enforce a federal
regulatory program); South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 514 (1988) (Congress can
regulate state activities but cannot "seek to control or influence the manner in which
States regulate private parties.").
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which involved a federal statute regulating the use and resale of
information from state Department of Motor Vehicle (DMV)
databases.9 '
In Reno v. Condon, the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the Driver's Privacy Protection Act (DPPA).'
The DPPA regulated the state's disclosure and resale of personal
information contained in the records of state DMVs.9 The State of
South Carolina and its Attorney General challenged the
constitutionality of the DPPA. The Court found that the DPPA was
a proper exercise of Congress' power to regulate under the
Commerce Clause and did not violate South Carolina's state
autonomy. The Court stated that drivers' information constituted an
instrumentality of commerce because "its sale or release into the
interstate stream of business is sufficient to support congressional
regulation."94
The Court then addressed South Carolina's argument that the
DPPA violated the Tenth Amendment because it required state
employees to learn and apply the Act's restrictions. Although the
Court acknowledged that "the DPPA's provisions will require time
and effort on the part of state employees,"'95 the Court nonetheless
concluded that the DPPA did not violate states' rights. The Court
analogized the case to South Carolina v. Baker, emphasizing that
although some state action may be necessary to comply with federal
regulation, such state involvement is inevitable and presents no
constitutional defect."' The Court concluded:
"[T]he DPPA does not require the States in their sovereign
capacity to regulate their own citizens. The DPPA regulates
the States as the owners of databases. It does not require the
South Carolina legislature to enact any laws or regulations, and
it does not require state officials to assist in the enforcement of
federal statutes regulating private individuals." 7
Thus, in order for federal electronic filing legislation to survive
constitutional scrutiny, Congress should first show that it seeks to
regulate a channel of interstate commerce, an instrumentality of
interstate commerce, or an activity that substantiallyaffects interstate
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

528 U.S. 141 (2000).
See iLat 150.
See id. at 146.
Id. at 148.
1d at 150.
See id. at 151.
Id.
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commerce. Second, Congress must be careful to craft legislation that
comports with state autonomy limits on the federal commerce power.
Because it is not acceptable practice for courts to compile and
sell court information, electronic filing legislation would not regulate
an instrumentality of interstate commerce. It is possible for the
Government to argue that the regulation of electronic filing involves
a channel of interstate commerce (namely, the Internet). The
Internet is a "channel" of interstate commerce because goods are sold
and transferred via the Internet. Thus, because electronic filing
requires Internet use, regulation of electronic filing constitutes
regulation of a channel of interstate commerce. However, it is
unclear whether this argument would succeed because the courts
have not yet addressed this issue.
Perhaps the best way Congress can demonstrate its power to
regulate under the Commerce Clause is to present evidence that the
sale and exchange of court information by private parties
substantially affects interstate commerce. Currently, such evidence
does not exist. Because relatively few courts have adopted electronic
filing, speculation about the potential impact on interstate commerce
may be too tenuous to withstand constitutional scrutiny. However, if,
in a few years, Congress were to hold hearings in order to adduce
evidence of substantial impact on interstate commerce, such evidence
could arguably satisfy this part of the inquiry.
If Congress adduces adequate evidence of substantial effect on
interstate commerce or can show that it is regulating a channel of
interstate commerce, it must then craft federal legislation that
complies with state autonomy limits on the federal commerce power.
Like the DPPA in Reno v. Condon, electronic filing legislation should
restrict the ability of states and private individuals to sell or exchange
certain court information. However, such legislation must not require
"the States in their sovereign capacity to regulate their own citizens"
or to enact legislation.9"
V. The Constitutional Right to Informational Privacy
Although it appears that legislation is the most likely solution to
electronic filing privacy problems, there may also be a judicial
solution to Internet privacy problems - constitutional protection for
informational privacy rights. Although the Supreme Court has not
officially recognized such a right, the increasing wealth, speed, and
98. Id. at 142.

Sprinp-20001

ELECTROINIC FILING AND PRIVACY

prevalence of the Internet may force the Court to address privacy
concerns and, ultimately, to decide whether or not a privacy right in
personal information actually exists.
The right to privacy is not expressly recognized in the
Constitution. However, courts do recognize a right to privacy,
described over a century ago by Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren
as the "right to be let alone." 99 Although the Supreme Court has
made clear that there is no general right to privacy,"' the Court has
recognized a right to privacy in making certain kinds of decisions. 1
For instance, the landmark decision of Roe v. Wade established that a
woman's right of privacy included the right to terminate her
pregnancy."' Roe also limited the right to privacy to issues involving
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child
rearing, and education."3
The privacy right implicated in the Internet and electronic filing
context is the right to informational privacy: an individual's interest in
avoiding disclosure of personal matters.0 4 Although the Supreme
Court has never explicitly recognized an informational privacy right,
the growth of the Internet and increasing privacy concerns will likely
prompt the Supreme Court to consider the informational privacy
issue. If and when the issue arises, the Court should recognize a
limited right to informational privacy.
(A limited right to
informational privacy would more effectively balance an individual's
privacy rights against the public's right to information than would an
absolute privacy right, which may run afoul of First Amendment free
speech rights.)
Despite the Supreme Court's silence on the subject, some circuit
courts have used Justice Stevens' majority opinion in Whalen v. Roe
to create a right to informational privacy. 5 In Whalen, the Court
discussed two kinds of privacy interests: "the interest in independence
in making certain kinds of important decisions" and "the individual

99. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193 (Dec. 1890).
100. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967) (stating that there is no
"general constitutional 'right to privacy"').
101. See GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
538 (13th ed. 1997).
102. 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
103. See id. at 152-53.
104. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589,599 (1977).
105. Id. at 599-600
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interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters."'16 It is the latter
interest from which some circuit courts have derived the right to
informational privacy.
At issue in Whalen was a New York law that required physicians
to identify patients who took certain kinds of prescription drugs," so
that their names and addresses could be recorded in a central
computerized database." The Court upheld the statute because the
risk of public disclosure of information was minimal: the state statute
required stringent security precautions on behalf of the Health
Department and imposed criminal liability on anyone who publicly
disclosed the information."' The Court did not decide whether a
broad informational privacy right existed: "We therefore need not,
and do not, decide any question which might be presented by the
unwarranted disclosure of accumulated private data whether
intentional or unintentional or by a system that did not contain
comparable security provisions.'
Although the Court did not find a violation of an informational
privacy right in Whalen, the Court acknowledged the privacy dangers
inherent in our technologically advanced society."' The Supreme
Court has never decided a case in which it found that a government
regulation violated the constitutional informational privacy right
discussed in Whalen. However, a number of circuit courts have used
Whalen to recognize a right to informational privacy. Although it
has not happened yet, it is possible that other courts may use a similar
analysis to recognize a right to informational privacy in the Internet
context.
The Third Circuit in United States v. Westinghouse recognized the

106. Id.
107. See, e.g., U.S. v. Westinghouse, 638 F.2d 570, 580-82 (3d Cir. 1980); Plante v.
Gonzales, 575 F.2d 1119, 1132 (5th Cir. 1978).
108. The law sought to prevent overuse and over-prescribing of certain kinds of
prescription drugs, which were labeled as "Schedule II" drugs. Schedule II drugs included
types of drugs that are dangerous, but prescribed by some physicians for legitimate
medical purposes. See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 592-93.
109. Id. at 593
110. See id. at 594-95
111. Id at 605-606.
112. Id. at 605.
113. See, e.g., In re Crawford, 194 F.3d 954, 958 (9th Cir. 1999); Doe v. City of New
York, 15 F.3d 264, 267 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Westinghouse, 638 F.2d 570, 577
(3d Cir. 1980); Plante v. Gonzales, 575 F.2d 1119, 1127-28 (5th Cir. 1978).
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individual's right to prevent disclosure of personal information."'
There, an employer refused to release his employees' medical records
to the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
(NIOSH)."' The court stated: "There can be no question that an
employee's medical records, which may contain intimate facts of a
personal nature, are well within the ambit of materials entitled to
privacy protection. ' ' .. The court found that such privacy could only
be invaded if the "societal interest in disclosure outweighs the privacy
interest on the specific facts of the case." 7 The court listed factors to
be considered in this balancing test:
The factors which should be considered in deciding whether an
intrusion into an individual's privacy is justified are the type of
record requested, the information it does or might contain, the
potential for harm in any subsequent nonconsensual disclosure,
the injury from disclosure to the relationship in which the
record was generated, the adequacy of safeguards to prevent
unauthorized disclosure, the degree of need for access, and
whether there is an express statutory mandate, articulated
public policy, or other recognizable public interest militating
toward access.'
Applying the factors, the court found that the societal interest in
the occupational safety and health of employees was substantial in
relation to the "minimal intrusion into the privacy which surrounds
the employees' medical records.""' 9 However, the court also held that
NIOSH should give notice to employees whose medical records it
wants to examine.'
Furthermore, individual employees should be
allowed to raise his or her own privacy claim, since it is improper to
"assume that an employee's claim of privacy as to particular sensitive
data in that employee's 2 file will always be outweighed by NIOSH's
need for such material.' '
Likewise, the Fifth Circuit in Plante v. Gonzales recognized the
right to informational privacy and applied a similar balancing test to
determine when the public dissemination of personal information is

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1980).
See id- at 572-73.
Id. at 577.
IM at578.
Id.
Id. at 580.
See id. at 581.
Id at 581.
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warranted."
In Plante, five state senators challenged the financial
disclosure provisions of Florida's Sunshine Amendment on the
grounds that it violated their right to privacy."2 The court recognized
the importance of financial privacy,"U but found that "[t]he public
interests supporting public disclosure for these elected officials are
even stronger."' '
The Fourth Circuit in Walls v. City of Petersburgalso recognized
the right to informational privacy."2 The court, however, severely
limited the right by holding that there could be no violation of an
informational privacy right, unless the information itself implicated a
fundamental right." In Walls, a government employee declined to
answer four questions on a questionnaire, including the following:
"Have you ever had sexual relations with a person of the same
sex?"" The court found that the employee did not have a right to
keep that information private because there is no recognized right to
homosexual conduct: "The Court [in Bowers v. Hardwick] explicitly
rejected the proposition that any kind of private sexual conduct
between consenting adults is constitutionally insulated from state
proscription."' 29 However, the court also acknowledged the privacy
problems associated with technological advances:
In the past few decades, technological advances have provided
society with the ability to collect, store, organize, and recall vast
amounts of information about individuals in sophisticated
computer files. This database capability is already being
extensively used by the government, financial institutions, and
marketing research firms to track our travels, interests,
preferences, habits, and associates. Although some of this
information can be useful and even necessary to maintain order
and provide communication and convenience in a complex
society, we need to be ever diligent to guard against misuse.
Some information still needs to be private, disclosed to the
public only if the person voluntarily chooses to disclose it."0
In contrast, the Sixth Circuit in J.P. v. DeSanti completely

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

575 F.2d 1119, 1134-35 (5th Cir. 1978).
Id. at 1121-22.
See id. at 1135.
Id. at 1136.
895 F.2d 188, 193 (4th Cir. 1990).
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 194-95.
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rejected the right to informational privacy. 3' In that case, juveniles
brought suit to prevent the compilation and dissemination of
information by state probation authorities.'32 The court stated: "We
do not view the discussion of confidentiality in Whalen v. Roe as...
creating a constitutional right to have all government action weighed
against the resulting breach of confidentiality."'33 The court
concluded that the right to privacy is limited to fundamental rights." 4
Since no fundamental right was implicated in J.P v. DeSanti, there
could be no corresponding right to privacy.35 Furthermore, the court
noted that "none [has] cite[d] a constitutional provision in support of
[the existence of a constitutional right to nondisclosure of private
information]. ,,136
A. Recognition of a Limited Constitutional Informational Privacy
Right

We live in an "information age," where people are more
concerned than ever about access and misuse of their personal
information.137 Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly
recognized a constitutional right to informational privacy, some
circuit courts have already acknowledged such a right. Because
Internet growth and increased access to information will persist, the
Supreme Court may soon have to decide whether an informational
privacy right actually exists. If the Supreme Court is faced with this
issue, it should recognize a limited constitutional right to
informational privacy right.
If the Court recognizes an informational privacy right, this right
should exist narrowly and evolve slowly to accommodate changing
societal and legal climates. A broad, blanket right would be both
impractical and unlikely, given that the courts have generally
recognized an informational privacy right only in cases where a
government entity has required involuntary disclosure of personal
information. Furthermore, applying an informational privacy right to
disclosure of every instance where personal information is requested
would be overbroad and contrary to other well-settled principles. For
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

653 F.2d 1080, 1088-89 (6th Cir. 1981).
See id. at 1081-82.
Id. at 1088-89.
See id. at 1088-90.
Id.
Id. at 1090.
See Brin, supra note 45, at 25-26.
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example, the public has an interest in government disclosure of
information - the notion that the public has a right to know. Thus,
the informational privacy right should be limited to situations where
the government (or state actor) requires the involuntary disclosure of
personal information. In such cases, the court should apply a
balancing test to determine whether the invasion of privacy is
warranted; if the government interest in disclosure outweighs the
individual's privacy right, the disclosure is warranted. This approach
is ideal because it properly weighs society's interest in the information
against the individual's right to confidentiality, and does not
undermine the current state of privacy jurisprudence.
B. Application of the Limited Right to Electronic Filing
Although a constitutional informational privacy right will be
helpful in many Internet contexts and provide a useful constitutional
foundation to privacy claims, it may not prove useful in the electronic
filing context for two reasons. First, in order for the informational
privacy right to apply, the individual's disclosure must be
"involuntary." In the electronic filing context, it is debatable whether
litigants provide information in court filings "involuntarily."
It
appears that plaintiffs provide their information voluntarily by
initiating lawsuits. However, defendants must disclose information to
respond to plaintiff's allegations and to avoid default judgment.
Thus, one could argue that defendants involuntarily provide court
information.
Nevertheless, even if the "involuntary" prong is
satisfied for defendants, it would be both impractical and inefficient
to require courts to engage in a balancing inquiry at the outset of
every lawsuit. Because of the difficulty in applying a constitutional
informational privacy right to electronic filing, it appears that
legislation would be a more practical solution to electronic filing
problems.
Conclusion
Courts are moving toward a uniform electronic filing system that
increases efficiency, cuts costs, and improves access to the judicial
system."' In the past few years, Internet use has grown rapidly. New
technology and increased access of information is making everyday
tasks and transactions easier and more efficient. The Internet is

138. See Daitch & Ytterberg, supra note 2, at 97. See also Wells & Winger, supra note
24, at 1.
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changing the way society thinks, interacts, and conducts business.
Uniform electronic filing is the first step to a more efficient
judicial system. Once a uniform system is in place, on-line users will
be able to access court documents freely. However, the efficiency of
electronic filing has a price - with the ease and convenience of the
Internet comes a loss of informational privacy. With this loss of
informational privacy comes an increase in potential misuse of
information. Thus, this "information age" has resulted in a need to
curtail public access to confidential information.
Because we live in a society where information is valuable and
plentiful, there is an increasing need to explore new ways of
protecting personal information. Uniform state legislation is one way
to create guidelines and standards for state court filings. Federal
legislation of electronic filing is another possibility. In enacting
federal legislation, Congress may use its Commerce Clause power to
regulate the sale and use of information obtained from state court
Such legislation would depend upon the
electronic filings.
Government's ability to demonstrate that electronic filing has a
"substantial effect" on interstate commerce or that electronic filing on
the Internet constitutes a "channel" of interstate commerce.
Although the Court has not yet explicitly recognized a
constitutional right to informational privacy, the current nature and
growth of the Internet may force the Court to consider whether such
a right exists. Recognition of a limited informational privacy right
may help individuals protect their personal information. Such a right
should apply in situations where the government is requiring
involuntary disclosure of personal information. It is presently unclear
whether litigants "involuntarily" disclose their personal information.
Whether applicable to electronic filing or not, a limited informational
privacy right will provide a strong constitutional backdrop for the
many Internet privacy claims that will undoubtedly come to light.
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